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Excessive short-term debt is thought to be one of the major causes of the Asian 
financial crisis, and this paper documents the changes in the maturity of corporate 
debt in Thailand during a period of rapid integration with international capital 
markets.  Using data from publicly-traded Thai corporations for the period 1993-97, 
we find that the evidence is weak at best that financial liberalization brought about by 
globalization reduced the maturity of corporate debt contracts, and the evidence may 
in fact support an increase in maturity.  This result casts some doubts on the generality 
of the idea that financial liberalization created the short-term debt problem. 
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The Asian financial crisis of 1997, which was triggered by financial turmoil in 
Thailand in June 1997 and then spread to the rest of East Asia,
1 generated substantial 
interest in the nexus between financial globalization (and financial liberalization in 
particular) and corporate debt maturity.  In particular, it has been argued that financial 
liberalization led to the shortening of debt maturity, since both firms and banks were 
given increased access and more choice over their portfolios without commensurate 
improvements in their long-term incentive structure and adequate prudential 
regulation.  This in turn led to swift increases in macroeconomic fragility. 
Researchers and policy-makers were thus led to reconsider the effects of 
financial liberalization, and eventually a new synthesis emerged, neatly captured by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), in which the effects of financial liberalization 
involve both short-term pain and long-term gain.  The experience of South Korea 
became the archetype for this view, given both the relative importance of the South 
Korean economy in East Asia and the fact that the case strongly confirmed the new 
synthesis.
2   
In this paper, we examine the effects of financial liberalization on corporate 
debt maturity in Thailand, where the crisis began, and we consider whether the 
experience of South Korea generalizes to other countries.  In particular, we consider 
whether Thai corporations increased their reliance on short-term debt in the run-up to 
the 1997 crisis, and whether this reliance resulted from financial liberalization or from 
other factors driving the maturity of corporate debt.  We document the evolution of 
corporate debt maturity in Thailand during two different stages of international 
                                                 
1  See Corden, 2002: 209-212, and Isard, 2005: 142-144 for fascinating accounts of this crisis. 
2  See Booth, 2001, for the relevance of the issue for the South Korean macroeconomy, and Guerrero, 
2006b, for a systematic documentation of the link between increased financial globalization and the 
shortening in corporate debt maturity in South Korea. 
  2financial integration: early-stage financial globalization during 1993-94, and rapid 
financial globalization during 1995-97.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes 
some specialized literature connected with this study and places this paper in context.  
Section three presents and discusses the main results of this investigation, including 
some robustness exercises.  Section four concludes the paper.          
 
2.  Debt Maturity and Thailand’s Crisis 
A number of studies have argued that debt maturity played a key role in the 
Asian financial crisis.  Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha (2000) point out that half of all 
new loans from international banks in the period preceding the crisis had maturities of 
one year or less, and the volume of short-term debt grew fastest in East Asia.  In 
Thailand short-term debt rose to around 120% of reserves (a figure that pales 
compared to the Korean figure of 200%), and since short-term borrowing was 
procyclical with the macroeconomy, the reversal in the balance of payments that came 
with the crisis was thus dramatic. 
Alba, Hernandez, and Klingebiel (1999) argued that Thailand’s financial crisis 
was fundamentally caused by private debt, and that financial liberalization was the 
main reason for this.  Between 1990 and 1996, private external debt doubled as a 
share of Thailand’s GDP, though the overall share of this debt that was short-term 
remained relatively stable, and the most dramatic expansion of international 
borrowing was by Thai banks and offshore institutions (i.e., the Bangkok International 
Banking Facility).  Finance companies in particular began to borrow most of their 
funds with maturities of three months or less, and found their portfolio maturity 
increasingly mismatched.  Financial liberalization, they argue, led to this borrowing 
  3because it increased competition and reduced profit margins, thereby increasing 
incentives to practice unsound banking behavior in the absence of adequate prudential 
regulation.  Financial liberalization was also accompanied by an increased 
international openness, so Thai firms had greater access to unhedged funds 
denominated in foreign currency, which made it susceptible to exchange rate risk. 
  What determines the maturity structure of corporate debt elsewhere?  While 
much of the literature
3 on corporate debt maturity has concentrated on analyzing its 
effects on the value of the firm, there have been a number of studies on the external 
determinants of debt maturity, and some of this literature has focused on international 
case studies and comparisons.  Barclay and Smith (1995), for example, find evidence 
that larger firms in the U.S. tend to have longer debt maturities, along with those firms 
under more regulation, while firms with more growth opportunities rely on shorter 
maturities, perhaps because of information asymmetries.  These basic findings have 
been confirmed by several studies, including Stohs and Mauer (1996), Cunat (1999), 
Ozkan (2000 and 2002) for a sample of British firms, Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe 
(2003) for a sample of small Belgian firms, and Chen, Ho, and Yeo (1999) for firms 
in Singapore.   
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) examined the capital structure of 
firms in 30 developing and developed countries during the period 1980-1991, and 
found that the presence of well-developed stock markets was an important 
determinant of the positive relationship between firm size and debt maturity, since 
small firms in countries where bank lending was the dominant form of finance tended 
to use relatively less short-term debt.  Niskanen and Niskanen (2001) found for a 
sample of Finnish firms that bank ownership of stock helped solve the contracting 
                                                 
3 The literature on corporate debt maturity is much more extensive than what we review here, and a 
good summary can be found in Ravid (1996).   
  4problem, so smaller firms with more bank ownership and growth opportunities were 
able to get longer maturities on their debts.  Similarly, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Raman (2005) found that more managerial stock ownership led to shorter debt 
maturities. 
Other studies have focused on the effects of specific policies or 
macroeconomic variables on the maturity of corporate debt, including, prominently, 
the impact of inflation on the shortening in the maturity structure of corporate debt 
(e.g., Klein, 1975; Aarstol, 2000; and Guerrero, 2004 and 2006a).  Miller (1997) 
found evidence that political instability and polarization have an important role in 
creating inflation uncertainty and thus shorter debt maturities.   
  Closer to this paper are studies by Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001 and 2006) 
and Guerrero (2006b).  Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001, 2006) conduct a cross-
country study of the effects of globalization on firms’ financing choices in an 
unbalanced panel of firms in eight Latin American and East Asian countries.   
Interestingly, Thailand is one of the countries in their study, though they did not 
derive country-specific conclusions and they were mainly interested in studying the 
effects of financial crisis on firms’ financing choices.  Guerrero (2006b) finds a 
reduction in corporate debt maturity prior to the Asian financial crisis for publicly-
traded firms in South Korea, and traces back the origin of the phenomenon to the 
early stages of financial globalization.  Finally, the debt maturity of Thai corporations 
in the run-up to the financial crisis has been studied by Wiwattanakantang, Kali, and 
Charumilind (2003), who found that firms with close relationships with banks were 
more likely to borrow with longer maturities.   
 
  53.  The Effects of Liberalization on Corporate Debt Maturity in Thailand 
Was the reduction in the maturity of international debt mirrored in the patterns 
of corporate debt in Thailand, and are the initial effects of financial liberalization 
generalizable beyond the banking and financial sector?  Did Thai corporations also 
respond to financial liberalization by taking advantage of increased access to short-
term lending markets?  Did Thai banks try to match the maturity of their domestic 
lending to that of their own international borrowing?   
In this paper, we examine the maturity structure of corporate debt in Thailand, 
and how it responded to globalization, as measured by proxies for financial 
liberalization, increased access to international bond and equity markets, and the 
increase in the development of the domestic equity and financial markets.  This paper 
purposefully excludes the period after 1997, because the focus is on the effects of 
globalization on corporate debt maturity in the years that lead to the crisis.  Our data 
is a subset of the dataset used in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001, 2006), but given the 
differences in goals and scope between this paper and theirs, we use a balanced panel 
to be able track the evolution of the same firms during the run-up to the crisis. 
   
3.1.  Definition of Variables 
The dependent variable in all our regressions is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt (LTD/TD).  Following the recent empirical literature that studies firms’ 
financing decisions (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, et al., 2001; 
Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2001 and 2006) the vector of observable firm 
characteristics includes five variables.  The first variable is a proxy for the size of the 
firm, the logarithm of a firm’s net fixed assets (NFA).  The second variable is an 
indicator of asset tangibility, the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA).  
  6The third variable, an indicator of firms’ revenues, is the ratio of net sales to net fixed 
assets (S/NFA).  The fourth variable proxies the profitability of firms with the ratio of 
profits to total assets (PF/TA).  Descriptive statistics for these five variables are 
shown in Table 1.   
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
To capture the potential effects of expanded financing opportunities through 
increased access to international bond and equity markets on the maturity of corporate 
debt, two proxies for access to international debt and equity markets are included.  
The variable capturing access to international bond markets is a dummy variable 
(BONDS) that takes the value of one for periods in which a given firm issues bonds in 
international capital markets, and zero otherwise.  The variable capturing access to 
international equity markets is defined as a dummy variable (EQUITY) that takes the 
value one from the moment when a firm starts trading (or raising capital) in 
international equity markets, and zero otherwise.   
Two alternative measures to proxy for financial liberalization are used.  First, 
we use the arithmetic average of four individual financial liberalization indices 
(AFLI) that capture the degrees of liberalization of interest rates caps, the degree of 
control of private credit by the central bank, the level of marginal and average reserve 
requirements, and restrictions to both capital inflows and capital outflows.  Each of 
the individual indices takes three possible values (1, 2, or 3), where 3 represents full 
financial liberalization, 2 partial financial repression, and 1 full financial repression.  
The information to construct these indices was taken from Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002).  This multidimensional index of financial liberalization is the reported in the 
  7tables below.  We also considered a dummy variable that follows the stock market 
liberalization dates reported in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), but the results were 
unchanged.  
To control for the effects of rapid development of the domestic equity and 
credit markets on the maturity of corporate debt, we follow Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2000) and proxy for the degree of financial development (FD) with the sum 
of both stock market capitalization and the outstanding liabilities of the banking 
sector, expressed as a share of GDP.  
The inflation rate, as measured by the rate of change of the Consumer Price 
Index), and the real GDP growth rate were both used to control for the effects of the 
macroeconomic environment on the maturity of corporate debt.  Neither had a 
significant effect in our regressions, so we do not report these results in the tables 
below.  
 
3.2.  Econometric Estimations and Baseline Results 
We estimate six different alternative specifications: (i) Ordinary Least 
Squares, (ii) firm-specific Fixed Effects, (iii) Random Effects, (iv) Instrumental 
Variables, with  the right-hand-side regressors instrumented using first lags, (v) Fixed 
Effects and Instrumental Variables, using both the first and second lags as 
instruments, and (vi) the Arellano-Bond (1993) specification, using a dynamic panel 
data Generalized Method of Moments procedure that controls both for the potential 
endogeneity of the microeconomic variables used as right-hand-side regressors, as 
well as for the potential time-series problems of the left-hand-side endogenous 
variable.  Results for these baseline regressions are shown in Table 2.  All regressions 
include an unreported constant term.  
  8The OLS estimate provides the basic multivariate correlation embedded in the 
data, and these results are shown in column 1 of Table 2.  However, OLS estimates 
are usually criticized when used with individual or firm-level data because they do not 
control for unobservable characteristics that could be biasing the estimated 
coefficients or introducing a potential reverse causation problem.  To control for some 
of these unobservable characteristics, the firm-specific Fixed Effects estimation 
procedure is estimated, and the results are shown in column 2.  Because the fixed-
effects estimates disregard all the cross-sectional variation, we also include an 
alternative (static) panel data technique using Random Effects estimates, with a 
weighted average of the purely cross-sectional estimate and the Fixed Effects 
estimates.  These estimates are shown in column 3.   
The purely cross-sectional estimates are not included here for a couple of 
reasons.  First, they are subject to similar criticisms as OLS estimates.  There is also 
problem of the “between groups”, or purely cross-sectional estimate, in the present 
context is that by the very nature of our estimates completely disregards the time 
dimension of the data.  
Given the potential endogeneity of most – if not all – of the observable firm 
characteristics (size, tangibility of assets, profitability, etc), instrumental variable 
estimates that use the value of these variables lagged once presented in column 4, 
while estimates that combine fixed effects with two lags as instruments are given in 
column 5.  
Finally, column 6 contains the results produced by the Arellano-Bond (1993) 
estimation procedure, a more sophisticated instrumental-variables procedure that also 
takes care of potential problems of non-stationarity, by first differencing the data and 
including the lag of the dependent variable as a right-hand-side regressor.   
  9 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
As Table 2 shows, the most significant microeconomic determinants of 
corporate debt maturity are the firm’s size (NFA) and the tangibility of its assets 
(NFA/TA).  Consistent with the literature, we find that larger firms hold longer debts.  
The negative sign for the tangibility of assets implies that more tangible assets are 
associated with shorter maturity; this result is consistent across specifications and 
stands in opposition to what is usually observed in other case studies (in South Korea, 
for instance, as reported in Guerrero, 2006b).  No other microeconomic determinant 
of corporate debt is statistically significant for all or most econometric specifications, 
and this result is also different from results previously found for other emerging 
economies (e.g., Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2001, or Guerrero, 2004).  The sales ratio 
is insignificant, and the effect of profitability is insignificant in all cases but the fixed 
effect model, where the effect on maturity is negative.   
For the variables proxying the effects of financial globalization, we find that a 
firm’s access to international bond markets (BONDS) is positive and statistically 
significant in the first four specifications, but not in the last two. This result is in line 
with the ones reported in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001, 2006).  We dropped the 
EQUITY variable due to multicollinearity problems in these initial estimations.   
The next proxy for financial integration to the international markets is AFLI, 
the multidimensional index of financial liberalization.  This variable is insignificant in 
all specifications but the last, where it is positive.  In the GMM specification, the 
index for financial liberalization has a lengthening effect in corporate debt maturity, a 
finding that contradicts the ones in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001, 2006) and 
  10Guerrero (2006b).  This result suggests that it is not so clear that financial 
liberalization led to a shortening of debt maturity, at least for listed corporations in 
Thailand, and it may in fact have had the reverse effect.  
Finally, the FD variable that proxies for the degree of financial development 
of the domestic financial sector displays a similar pattern to AFLI, in that that it is 
insignificant in all but the last and most relevant specification, the only one that 
explicitly controls for potential dynamic problems; the indicator for Financial 
Development displays a significant degree of inertia, as does the dependent variable, 
so a dynamic specification is probably the most appropriate.  In the GMM 
specification, FD displays a strong and significant lengthening effect on the maturity 
of corporate debt.  Therefore, the overall effect of increased financial integration 
during the early stages of globalization is probably to lengthen the maturity of 
corporate debt, a finding that is in contrast to those reported previously by Schmukler 
and Vesperoni (2001, 2006), for an unbalanced panel of East Asian firms during the 
period 1980-99, and Guerrero (2006b), for the case of South Korea at an early stage 
of financial globalization. 
 
3.3.  Robustness of the Access Measurements  
Given the collinearity problem affecting the dummy variables BONDS and 
EQUITY for access to international capital markets in the regressions reported above, 
we next consider an alternative proxy for the access variables.  Specifically, we 
combine the two access variables into one, by measuring the number of times that 
firms had access to either the international bonds or equity markets.  The results are 
not very different from the ones displayed in Table 2 above, and are not shown 
  11separately, but the combined access variable becomes statistically and economically 
insignificant in all specifications.  
  A legitimate concern with the baseline regressions shown in Tables 2 and 
described above is related to the potential endogeneity bias introduced by the access 
variables.  To address that potential source of trouble, two strategies were followed.  
First, we use first lags of the same proxies used in Table 2, under the assumption that 
these lags were predetermined variables.  Second, we follow a twofold procedure in 
which we use lags of the same variable as instruments.  For access to equity markets, 
following both Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) and Ozkan (2000), we use two lags 
as instruments.  For access to bonds markets, we construct an instrument that 
indicates whether capital markets were open.  This instrument, first proposed by 
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001), takes a value of one if two conditions are fulfilled: 
(i) At least one firm had access to international bonds markets during that period, and 
(ii) the firm was able to issue international bonds at least once during the sample 
period.  Otherwise, the instrument takes a value of zero.  The results provided by the 
two strategies are shown in Table 3.  
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
Results are similar to the ones presented in Table 2 before.  First, larger firms, 
and those with less tangible assets, have longer debt maturities.  The sales variable 
remained insignificant in all cases and was dropped, while profit rates are now also 
insignificant in all cases.  Access to the international bonds market continues to have 
had a positive effect on maturity in four of the specifications, though not the same 
four cases.  Access to international equity markets has a mixed effect, positive in the 
  12OLS and IV specifications, negative in the dynamic GMM specification, and 
insignificant in the other three.  Financial liberalization and the degree of financial 
development both continue to conform to the results in Table 2, with both having a 
significant and positive effect on maturity in only the GMM specification.   
Indeed, if this last specification is the most appropriate, as we have argued, 
then financial globalization had a significant lengthening effect on corporate debt 
maturity through three different channels: financial liberalization, domestic capital 
markets development, and increased access to international bond markets.  The only 
force that partially offsets these lengthening effects is given by the access to 
international equity markets.     
 
4.  Conclusion 
  Using a balanced panel for publicly traded Thai firms, this paper documented 
the evolution of corporate debt maturity during the period prior to Thailand’s financial 
crisis in 1997, and considered whether or not financial liberalization caused Thai 
corporations to increase their short-term debt, as the new synthesis has argued.  While 
our results do confirm that larger firms used more long-term debt, we found the 
effects of financial liberalization to be not so clear.  Using six different specifications, 
we found some evidence that access to the international bonds market actually 
increased debt maturity, and while the effects of financial liberalization and financial 
development were mostly insignificant, we found that the dynamic specification we 
thought most appropriate to the data yielded positive and significant effects for both 
of these variables.  Our evidence here stands in stark contrast with previous findings 
for other East Asian economies, especially in South Korea, and thus our results call 
into question the generality of the new synthesis.  Thailand’s financial sector may 
  13have borrowed heavily using short-term debt instruments from international markets, 
but it is not so clear that Thailand’s corporations did the same. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Microeconomic variables 
              
Variables      Mean  Std  Dev    Max    Min        # of Observations 
LTD/TD overall 
1 0.264 0.241  0.929  -0.035  N 
4 =      883 
 between 
2   0.209     0.788    0.000  n 
5   =      182 
 within 
3   0.119     0.777    -0.314  T-bar 
6 =   4.851 
             
NFA overall  8.943  0.673  11.153  6.923  N  =  1107 
  between    0.650    10.967     7.126  n =  230 
  within    0.185    10.094     7.667  T-bar =  4.813 
              
NFA/TA  overall  0.358  0.257  0.967    0.001  N =  1107 
  between    0.249     0.923    0.003  n =  230 
  within    0.071     0.887    -0.189  T-bar =  4.813 
              
S/NFA  overall  4.886  10.044  126.866    -5.132  N =  1104 
  between    9.317    84.042  0.079  n =  230 
  within    4.582    47.711  -74.707  T-bar =  4.8 
              
PF/TA  overall  0.029  0.089     0.364    -1.108  N =  1106 
  between    0.0633     0.295    -0.310  n =  230 
  within    0.0631     0.363    -0.870  T-bar =  4.808 
Notes:              
  
1 Overall means combined between and within variation;  
  
2 Between means across firms; 
  
3 Within means across years; 
  
4 N=total number of observations; 
  
5 n= number of firms; 
  
6 T-bar=average number of years of data available for the firms included in the sample. 
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Table 2:  Baseline Regressions 
 
Dependent variable is (LTD/TD) 
 OLS  Fixed  Random   IV(1)  IV(2)  GMM 
   Effects  Effects    +  FE   
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
NFA (size)  0.217  0.194  0.21  0.215  0.286  0.236 
  (16.68)** (5.31)** (10.61)**  (14.15)**  (0.67)  (3.10)** 
NFA/TA (tangibility)  -0.086  -0.291 -0.177 -0.034 -2.406 -0.421 
 (-2.46)*  (-4.05)** (-3.84)**  (-0.74)  (-2.04)* (-2.96)** 
S/NFA (sales)  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  0.03  0.001 
  (-1.67) (-1.6) (-1.75)  (-0.86) (0.3)  (0.42) 
PF/TA (profits)  -0.053  -0.181  -0.129  0.047  -1.052  -0.123 
  (-0.71) (-2.50)* (-1.94)  (-0.35)  (-1.78) (-1.11) 
BONDS (access)  0.234  0.16  0.171 0.199 0.06 0.082 
  (6.01)** (5.12)** (5.65)** (4.44)**  (0.62)  (1.69) 
AFLI (fin. liberalization)  -0.294  -0.356  -0.381  0.533  0.176  1.323 
 (-0.9)  (-1.45)  (-1.69)  (0.58)  (0.15)  (1.99)* 
FD (fin. development)  0.038  0.025  0.022  0.295  0.304  0.733 
  (0.66) (0.61) (0.57) (0.97) (0.45)  (2.69)** 
Lagged (LTD/TD)            0.598 
        (5.11)** 
         
R-Squared 0.34  0.78    0.32  0.65   
F-Statistic 63.38  12.87    43.61  4.33   
Chi-Squared Statistic      205.7      47.38 
Notes: 
t-statistics in parentheses below coefficients.  (**) significant at 1%; (*) significant at 5%  
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Table 3:  Endogenity of Access Variables 
 
Dependent variable is (LTD/TD) 
 OLS  Fixed  Random    IV  IV  w/FE  GMM 
    Effects  Effects     
NFA  (size)  0.209  0.199 0.208 0.202 0.324 0.254 
 (15.93)**  (5.35)**  (10.30)**  (13.17)**  (-0.82)  (3.37)** 
NFA/TA (tangibility)  -0.071  -0.288 -0.166 -0.013  -2.24  -0.421 
 (-2.03)*  (-3.96)**  (-3.58)**  (-0.28)  (-2.21)*  (-2.99)** 
PF/TA  (profits)  -0.032  -0.169 -0.108  0.047 -0.982 -0.137 
 (-0.43)  (-2.30)*  (-1.61)  (0.36)  (-1.69)  (-1.23) 
BONDS (access)  0.008  0.008  0.008 0.006 0.001 0.005 
 (2.84)**  (3.94)**  (3.91)**  (1.89)  (0.11)  (2.03)* 
EQUITY (access)  0.118  0.017  0.058 0.13  -0.073  -0.177 
 (3.72)**  (0.4)  (1.67)  (3.97)**  (-0.4)  (-2.27)* 
AFLI (fin. liberalization)  -0.361  -0.355  -0.385  0.585  0.173  1.386 
  (-1.11)  (-1.43) (-1.69) (-0.64) (-0.15) (2.09)* 
FD (fin. development)  0.024  0.019  0.015  0.331  0.332  0.775 
  (0.42)  (0.46) (0.39) (1.09) (0.54)  (2.85)** 
Lagged  (LTD/TD)         0.586 
         ( 5 . 1 4 ) * *  
      
R-Squared 0.34  0.78    0.33 0.7   
F-Statistic 52.07  10.34    40.35  4.96   
Chi-Squared statistic      201.51      48.17 
Notes: 
t-statistics in parentheses below coefficients.  (**) significant at 1%; (*) significant at 5%  
The variable S/NFA was consistently insignificant and was therefore dropped. 
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